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INTO THE GRAY ZONE: EXAMINING MUTUAL COMBAT
AS A DEFENSE TO DOMESTIC ASSAULT
ABSTRACT
For offenses committed under Virginia’s assault and battery
against a household or family member statute, the State should pros-
ecute and punish in cases where both parties committed an assault
and battery. Punishment, however, should consist of mainly individ-
ualized counseling or some other mitigated punishment for cases of
mutual fighting.
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the State of Virginia had 21,158 arrests for misde-
meanor assault and battery of a family or household member and
1,632 felony arrests.1 Of those 22,790 arrested, 1,613 were found not
1. MARK R. HERRING, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA: 2014 ANNUAL REPORT, APPENDIX A P. C (2014), https://rga.lis
.virginia.gov/Published/2015/RD1/PDF [https://perma.cc/95KA-XYN3].
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guilty, 6,787 were nolle prossed, and 3,721 were dismissed.2 For the
felony and misdemeanor convictions combined, 5,090 of those ar-
rested for this crime were found guilty.3 “The court, when hearing
these [domestic violence] cases, communicates a public message as
to how society views intimate partner violence and what is the ap-
propriate societal response.” 4 When culpability is not clear, we enter
into the gray area of domestic violence law.5 The question remains
as to how Virginia courts should respond to domestic violence situa-
tions when it appears to be a mutual combat situation.
This Note will examine the validity of using mutual combat as a
defense to assault and battery of a family or household member in
Virginia. I will argue that, where the evidence suggests that both in-
volved parties committed assault and battery, Virginia courts should
not recognize mutual combat as a defense but should consider entering
a conviction for both parties. Part I will cover Virginia’s statute prohib-
iting assault and battery of a family or household member. Part II will
define mutual combat and discuss how it applies in domestic violence
situations. In Part III, I will discuss the State’s current response
to reciprocal violence. I will primarily discuss how police respond to
reciprocal violence at time of arrest and the court’s answer at time of
prosecution. Finally, Part IV will examine alternative solutions to the
problem of reciprocal violence in mutual domestic violence situations.
I will argue that in cases where either party could be the predominant
aggressor, the court should not dismiss the case. Rather, I will argue
that the proper response is to convict the defendant. However, courts
should consider sentencing the offenders with individualized counsel-
ing or some other mitigated punishment for cases of mutual fighting.
I. ASSAULT AND BATTERY AGAINST A FAMILY OR
HOUSEHOLD MEMBER
In Virginia, “[a]ny person who commits an assault and battery
against a family or household member is guilty of a Class 1 misde-
meanor.” 6 If a person has previously been convicted at least twice
of either assault or battery against a family member, various forms
of malicious or unlawful wounding, or strangulation, then any later
2. Id. at c, d (noting, however, that this may not include all arrests under VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-57.2(B). The source lists § 18.2-57.2(B) separately and lists 137 separate fel-
ony arrests in 2013. I did not include these arrests in the calculations.).
3. Id.
4. Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in Pro-
tective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 557, 559–60 (2006).
5. Margaret E. Martin, Double Your Trouble: Dual Arrests in Family Violence, 12
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 139, 141 (1997).
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(A) (2014).
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conviction for assault and battery of a family member is a felony.7
The statute does not specifically define assault or battery.8 When the
legislature does not define an element in a statute, Virginia courts
must apply the common law definition.9
Virginia defines assault in case law.10 An assault involves either
an “overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an
attempt, with force and violence, to do physical injury to the person
of another.”11 According to the common law in Virginia, a person com-
mits an assault when she or he “engages in an overt act intended to
inflict bodily harm and has the present ability to inflict such harm
or engages in an overt act intended to place the victim in fear or
apprehension of bodily harm and creates such reasonable fear or
apprehension in the victim.”12
In addition to assault, the statute also requires a showing of a
battery.13 As defined in Virginia case law, a battery is simply an un-
wanted and unlawful touching.14 Battery does not have to actually
result in an injury.15 Virginia does not include an element of physi-
cal force.16 Therefore, the touching does not need to be violent or
harmful.17 The touching must merely be unlawful.18 In United States
v. White, the court stated that “[t]he law is so jealous of the sanctity
of the person that the slightest touching of another, or of his clothes,
or cane, or anything else attached to his person, if done in a rude,
insolent, or angry manner, constitutes a battery for which the law
affords redress.”19 Whether a touch is a battery depends largely on
the intent of the actor.20 A touch is not unlawful if it has been fully
and validly consented to or when it is justified or excused.21
Unlike the terms assault and battery, the state statute does de-
fine “family or household member.”22 According to the Virginia Code,
“a family or household member” includes current or former spouses,
7. § 18.2-57.2(B) (noting that three or more convictions under the listed categories
result in a Class 6 felony).
8. § 18.2-57.2.
9. Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641 (2010).
10. See Merritt v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 653, 658 (1935).
11. Id. (citation omitted).
12. Clark, 279 Va. at 641.
13. § 18.27-57.2(A).
14. E.g., Gnadt v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 148, 151 (1998).
15. Id.
16. U.S. v. White, 606 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2010).
17. Id.
18. Gnadt, 27 Va. App. at 151.
19. White, 606 F.3d at 148 (quoting Crosswhite v. Barnes, 139 Va. 471 (1924)).
20. Gnadt, 27 Va. App. at 151.
21. Id.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2(D) (2014) (directing to the definition of “family or house-
hold member” listed in VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228).
620 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 24:617
regardless of whether they are currently living together.23 It also
includes parties with at least one child in common and parties who
cohabited within the last twelve months.24 A couple cohabits when
they live together like a married couple would.25 This means that
couples that cohabit must share “familial or financial responsibili-
ties” and “consortium.”26 An assault and battery must involve at least
one of the listed categories to be considered under this code section.27
This element differentiates domestic assault from a regular assault
and battery under Virginia law.28
II. EXAMINING MUTUAL COMBAT
The next part of this Note will discuss the concept of mutual com-
bat. The first section of this Part will examine the definition of mutual
combat. Next, I will differentiate mutual combat from self-defense.
Finally, I will explain why mutual combat should not be used to
argue that the alleged victim consented to the touching.
A. Defining Mutual Combat
Nationally, mutual combat does not have a set legal definition.29
In California, state courts recognize that mutual combat does not
merely mean that both sides exchanged blows, but rather, that there
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (2016).
24. Id.
25. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. 18, 20 (1885).
26. Rickman v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Va. App. 2000) (“Possible
factors establishing shared familial or f inancial responsibilities might include provisions
for shelter, food, clothing, utilities, and/or commingled assets. Factors that might estab-
lish consortium include mutual respect, f idelity, affection, society, cooperation, solace,
comfort, aid of each other, friendship, and conjugal relations. Other factors appropriate for
consideration include the length and continuity of the relationship.”).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (defining “family or house-
hold member” as “(i) the person’s spouse, whether or not he or she resides in the same
home with the person, (ii) the person’s former spouse, whether or not he or she resides
in the same home with the person, (iii) the person’s parents, stepparents, children, step-
children, brothers, sisters, half-brothers, half-sisters, grandparents and grandchildren,
regardless of whether such persons reside in the same home with the person, (iv) the
person’s mother-in-law, father-in-law, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law who reside in the same home with the person, (v) any individual who has
a child in common with the person, whether or not the person and that individual have
been married or have resided together at any time, or (vi) any individual who cohabits
or who, within the previous 12 months, cohabited with the person, and any children of
either of them then residing in the same home with the person.”).
28. See § 18.2-57(A) (“Any person who commits a simple assault or assault and battery
is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor, and if the person intentionally selects the person
against whom a simple assault is committed because of his race, religious conviction, color
or national origin, the penalty upon conviction shall include a term of confinement of at
least six months, 30 days of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of confinement.”).
29. People v. Ross, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 438, 445–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
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was a “mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding the ini-
tiation of hostilities.” 30 It can be thought of like a duel, where both
participants agree in advance to fight the other.31 According to the
United States Coast Guard, mutual combat means that both partici-
pants voluntarily agreed to enter into the fight or that the participa-
tion in the fight was voluntary after the fight began.32 This leaves
the possibility that even a fight that was not pre-agreed upon could
be considered mutual combat after the fact.33
In Virginia, courts have decided that mutual combat needs to
be both voluntary and mutually entered into.34 Mutual combat occurs
when, from the beginning to the end of the fray, both parties are
given blame.35 In homicide cases, situations of mutual combat can
persuade the court to give leniency.36 Virginia courts have found,
depending on the circumstances, that evidence of mutual combat may
be enough to drop a homicide from murder to manslaughter.37
Some sources treat any domestic assault situation where both
involved parties receive injuries as mutual combat.38 This character-
izes the issue both too widely and too narrowly.39 It is too wide be-
cause both parties may have injuries after an altercation in situations
that are not mutual combat.40 For example, both parties may be
injured in cases that involve one party acting in self-defense.41 Ad-
ditionally, the definition may be too narrow because not all recipro-
cal violence situations result in injury to both parties.42 A person can
commit a battery without leaving a detectible injury.43
30. Id. at 447 (quoting People v. Fowler, 174 P. 892, 897 (Cal. 1918)) (emphasis
omitted).
31. Id. at 446, 447 (“The ‘combat’ element of this rule is clear enough, at least for pres-
ent purposes. It suggests two (or more) persons fighting, whether by fencing with swords,
having a go at f isticuffs, slashing at one another with switchblades, or facing off with six-
guns on the dusty streets of fabled Dodge City.”).
32. E.g., In re Merchant Mariner’s Document No. Z-1111695, 1966 USCG LEXIS 14
at *8 (Sept. 2, 1966).
33. See id.
34. E.g., Harper v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 816, 820 (1936).
35. Bull v. Commonwealth, 55 Va. 613, 624 (1857).
36. Read v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. 924, 937–38 (1872).
37. Id.
38. See THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CURRENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 204 (David
Finklehor et al. eds., 1983) (“Note that in only 4% of the incidents are both parties injured.
Thus, if there is any validity to the mutual combat perspective (for given incidents), it
is relevant to a tiny fraction of the case . . . .” ).
39. See infra notes 40–43.
40. See Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of Heterosexual and Same-
Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and Response, 4 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 251, 284 (1994).
41. See id.
42. See Washington v. Commonwealth, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517 at *4 (Va. Ct. App.
2006).
43. Gnadt v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 148, 151 (1998).
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As other jurisdictions have noted, mutual combat is actually a
slight misnomer.44 It does not simply apply because both parties are
throwing punches.45 Rather, the “mutual” aspect refers to a common
plan or intention.46 It would not apply to many domestic violence
situations unless both parties agreed to the fight.47 However, laymen
use “mutual combat” to describe a situation where both parties are
engaged in reciprocal violence, even though the situation may not
be truly mutual combat.48
B. Mutual Combat Differs from Self-Defense
Self-defense occurs when one party uses force to repel an attack
or expected attack from the other.49 There are many qualifiers on
this defense.50 The amount of force used to repel an attack must be
reasonable.51 Defense counsels are known to confuse the concepts of
retaliation and self-defense.52 To successfully argue self-defense, the
accused cannot be at fault in the violent encounter.53 In an old case
involving mutual combat, the United States Supreme Court ruled
that neither party could claim self-defense because both parties were
“wrongdoers.” 54 The State of Virginia also accepts that self-defense
and mutual combat are mutually exclusive concepts.55
The case of Washington v. Commonwealth demonstrates how
defendants have tried and failed to use self-defense arguments in
situations with reciprocal violence.56 In this case, the defendant and
44. People v. Ross, 66 Cal. Rptr. 3d 438, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. Washington v. Commonwealth, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517 at *4 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
50. Infra notes 51, 53–55.
51. Harper v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 723, 730 (1955) (“[T]he defendant had the right
to do what seemed reasonably to be necessary to protect himself against such apparently
threatened attacks, whether the same was real or not, provided he believed it was real,
and for any injury done the plaintiff, by the defendant, in using reasonable means to de-
fend himself, the defendant is not liable . . . .” ) (citation omitted).
52. See, e.g., Washington, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517.
53. Smith v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414, 416 (Va. App. 1993) (“ ‘Justifiable homi-
cide in self-defense occurs [when] a person, without any fault on his part in provoking or
bringing on the difficulty, kills another under reasonable apprehension of death or great
bodily harm to himself.’ If an accused ‘is even slightly at fault’ at creating the diff iculty
leading to the necessity to kill, ‘the killing is not justifiable homicide.’ ”) (citations omitted).
54. Rowe v. United States, 164 U.S. 546, 556 (1896) (“Both parties to a mutual com-
bat are wrong-doers, and the law of self-defence [sic] cannot be invoked by either, so long
as he continues in the combat.”).
55. See Carr v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 656, 667 (1922).
56. Washington, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517.
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his wife got into a physical altercation.57 While the exact facts of the
incident were debated, the trial court determined that after drinking
a few beers, the defendant and his wife got into an argument because
the defendant wanted the car keys so that he could retrieve his pack
of cigarettes.58 Tired of the defendant’s “haranguing,” the wife then
slapped defendant in the face.59 The trial court claimed that defen-
dant then hit her back.60 The police were called and noticed red marks
on the defendant’s wife face and neck.61 The wife claimed at trial
that defendant did “hit” her but not in the face.62 The defendant tes-
tified that he never hit his wife, but he did push her against the wall
in retaliation to the slap.63 The court noted that there was no evi-
dence that the wife intended to deliver a second slap or do any other
additional aggressive act.64
The defense argued that the defendant’s physical response was
justifiable self-defense to the wife’s initial slap.65 The defense counsel
argued, “[i]f I’m at no fault, and somebody comes up and whacks me,
I can whack him back.” 66 The court rejected the defense’s argument
of self-defense, stating that there is a difference between retaliation
and self-defense.67 When the defendant is acting in retribution to the
initial strike, and when there is no evidence that the wife intended
to strike again, he cannot claim self-defense.68
C. Mutual Combat as Consent to Battery
Some defense lawyers argue that “[m]utual combat, or an agree-
ment to fight, is a form of consent.” 69 Under this theory, mutual com-
bat is therefore a defense to assault and battery because both parties
have consented to the touching.70 By consenting to the touching, the
57. Id. at *2.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Washington, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517 at *2.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at *3.
66. Id. at *5 n.3.
67. Id. at *5, *6.
68. Washington, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517 at *5, *6.
69. The difference between assault and battery in Virginia, COPENHAVER, ELLETT &
DERRICO: ROANOKE CRIMINAL ATTORNEYS, http://www.roanokecriminalattorney.com/prac
tice-areas/violent-crimes/assault-battery [https://perma.cc/NAQ3-S4SN].
70. E.g., id. (“This defense would claim that the alleged victim gave consent to some
form of physical contact. Mutual combat, or an agreement to fight, is a form of consent.”).
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battery element of the charge would fail, and therefore, the court could
not convict the defendant.71
The law does allow people to consent to acts that technically
cause harm to a person’s own body.72 For example, the rule allows peo-
ple to consent to surgery, which may involve physically cutting into a
person.73 Also, a person can consent to get their nose broken by agree-
ing to fight in a boxing match.74 Most domestic violence situations
differ from a boxing match because the parties in a boxing match
entered the ring with the understanding that both parties planned
on striking and potentially injuring the other.75 In a sense, the box-
ers want or accept the possibility of injury. In most domestic vio-
lence situations, even when both parties are causing injury, it is hard
to argue that either or both parties consented to be injured.76 Fur-
ther, in a boxing match, any consent that is present only lasts for as
long as both parties want or intend to remain a part of the fight.77
Parties who are looking for a fight differ from parties who become
entangled in a physical altercation.
III. THE STATE’S RESPONSE TO RECIPROCAL VIOLENCE
BETWEEN FAMILY OR HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS
A. The Role of Police and Arrests
When a police officer responds to a reported domestic assault,
Virginia state law states the officer’s course of action.78 Under the
law, the officer must make efforts to determine and arrest the pre-
dominant aggressor if the officer has probable cause to believe an
assault and battery has occurred.79 After looking at the totality of
the circumstances, the officer is to arrest “the predominant physical
71. See Gnadt v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 148, 151 (1998).
72. Luis E. Chiesa, Consent is Not a Defense to Battery: A Reply to Professor Bergelson,
9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 195, 203–05 (2011).
73. Id. at 205.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. See Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims
of Lesbians and Gay Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273, 283
(1993) (“This myth—that ‘s/he likes it’ or ‘it’s a two-way street’—is also common in het-
erosexual battering relationships. But the myth of mutual battering is particularly in-
vidious for same-sex couples . . . .” ).
77. See, e.g., Washington v. Commonwealth, No. 0822-05-1, 2006 Va. App. LEXIS 517
at *5–6 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
78. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (2014).
79. Id.
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aggressor unless there are special circumstances which would dic-
tate a course of action other than an arrest.”80 The officer determines
the primary physical aggressor by considering:
(i) who was the first aggressor, (ii) the protection of the health and
safety of family and household members, (iii) prior complaints of
family abuse by the allegedly abusing person involving the fam-
ily or household members, (iv) the relative severity of the inju-
ries inflicted on persons involved in the incident, (v) whether any
injuries were inflicted in self-defense, (vi) witness statements, and
(vii) other observations.81
Often, the predominant aggressor is the party who is most likely to
cause an injury or who is least likely to feel fear.82 Virginia police
may make a warrantless arrest under Virginia Code Section 18.2-
57.2 if based on probable cause or the officer’s personal observa-
tions.83 The statute does not require the officer to personally observe
the violation.84
The American Bar Association recognizes three main types of
domestic violence arrest policies: officer’s discretion, mandatory ar-
rests, and pro-arrests.85 A mandatory arrest policy generally means
an officer must make an arrest in certain circumstances.86 Officer’s
discretion policies, as the name suggests, leaves the final decision
on whether to arrest to the officer’s judgment.87 Pro-arrest policies,
also referred to as “preferred arrest provisions,” strongly encourage
an arrest in certain situations, but do not require it.88 These policies
are not always going to affect each state or jurisdiction within the
state equally.89 “For example, a state law may say that an arrest is
preferred in domestic violence cases, but a jurisdiction may choose
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Raquel Lazar-Paley, Domestic Violence: The San Diego Police Department’s Do-
mestic Violence Unit, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 72 n.17 (1997).
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(A) (2014).
84. Id.
85. A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ARREST POLICIES
BY STATE (2007), https://www.cga.ct.gov/jud/tfs/20110701_Task%20Force%20on%20Law
%20Enforcement%20Response%20to%20Family%20violence/20110928/Domestic%20
Violence%20Arrest%20Policies%20by%20State.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGZ3-7PYX].
86. DAVID HIRSCHEL, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: WHAT RESEARCH SHOWS ABOUT
ARRESTS AND DUAL ARRESTS RATES 4, 20 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/2226
79.pdf [https://perma.cc/WA5T-QLL9].
87. See id. at 4, 22 (noting, however, that often the state will usually still give guide-
lines about when an arrest is proper).
88. See id. at 4, 21.
89. Id. at 4.
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to make an arrest mandatory.” 90 The American Bar Association
tentatively considers Virginia’s arrest policy to be a mandatory ar-
rest policy.91
In all reports of “intimidation, simple assault and aggravated as-
sault incidents” that are reported to the police, police arrested a party
about thirty-seven percent of the time.92 The arrest rates increased
from 44.5 to fifty percent in cases involving domestic violence.93 Dual
arrests, referring to when police arrest both parties involved in an
assault and battery, accounted for one percent of all assault and in-
timidation arrests but were even higher (between 1.5 and two per-
cent) when the incident involved domestic violence.94 Studies show
that dual arrests occur more frequently in mandatory arrest juris-
dictions versus jurisdictions with preferred or discretionary policies.95
Dual arrests may be higher in mandatory arrest states because the
police officers may be more likely to arrest in cases of doubt and let
the court determine the party’s guilt.96
While Virginia has a mandatory arrest policy,97 the law does re-
quire the arresting officer to determine the predominant aggressor.98
The question remains about what a police officer should do if there
is no clear predominant aggressor, but the situation shows that both
parties were possible victims of assault and battery. In an unpub-
lished opinion, the Court of Appeals for Virginia suggested that an
officer could not arrest any party if it is unclear what party was the
predominant physical aggressor.99 However, given the case is unpub-
lished, therefore not binding, it does not necessarily set a mandatory
standard for other cases.100
90. Id.
91. A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 85 ( labeling Virginia’s arrest
policy as “Mandatory Arrest?” and noting that the off icer has discretion to determine if
“special circumstances” exist that call for solutions other than arrest).
92. HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 7.
93. Id. (“Arrest rates were higher when cases involved intimate partners (about 50 per-
cent) and other situations of domestic violence (44.5 percent).” ).
94. Id. (“Dual arrest rates were higher when cases involved intimate partners (about
2 percent) and other situations of domestic violence (1.5 percent).” ).
95. Id. at 13 (noting, however, that the percentage of incidents that result in dual ar-
rests is still very low).
96. Id.
97. A.B.A. COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 85.
98. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-81.3(B) (2014).
99. Roberts v. Cty. of Loudoun, No. 1575-13-4, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 248 at *2 (Va.
Ct. App. 2014) (“Based on his conversation with appellant’s father, Deputy Van Brocklin
determined ‘that a domestic assault occurred’ among the parties present in the home;
however, he was unable to determine which party was ‘the predominant physical ag-
gressor.’ Accordingly, he was unable to place any party under arrest for committing do-
mestic assault.” ).
100. Id.
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B. The Courts’ and Prosecutions’ Options in Deciding the Case
At trial, the court will either (1) enter a conviction, (2) dismiss
the case, (3) nolle pros the case, (4) enter a finding of not guilty, or
(5) defer the proceeding.101 Many Virginia jurisdictions have no-drop
policies for domestic abuse cases, meaning that the victim cannot
drop the charges against the defendant and stop the prosecution.102
As already discussed above, in order to be found guilty under Virginia
Code Section 18.2-57.2, the court must have enough evidence to prove
the defendant committed an assault and battery on a family or house-
hold member without proper justification.103 A deferral means that
the court placed the defendant on probation without currently being
found guilty.104 The court may, depending on availability, require the
defendant to apply for and complete a community-based treatment
program.105 I will discuss treatment programs in more detail later
in the Note.106 If the defendant successfully completes and complies
with the terms of the probation, the charges are formally dropped.107
According to a national study, forty-three percent of all intimi-
dation and assault and battery cases result in a conviction.108 A per-
son was sixty percent less likely to be convicted in a mandatory arrest
state than in a discretionary state.109 Compared to other domestic
violence cases, intimate partner violence cases were seventy percent
more likely to result in a conviction.110 Finally, the study notes that
gender did not influence whether the defendant would be convicted
at trial.111
C. Critics’ Arguments Against Dual Arrests and Convictions
There are good arguments against dual arrests.112 First, critics
are concerned that abusers will use the system to further harass or
101. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (2016); HERRING, supra note 1, at c.
102. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions: Domestic Violence Topics, NEWPORT NEWS, VA.,
OFFICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH’S ATTORNEY, http://www.nncwa.com/faqs/faqs.htm [https://
perma.cc/M93T-AWJE]; Frequently Asked Questions, SUFFOLK, VA., COMMONWEALTH’S AT-
TORNEY’S OFFICE, https://www.suffolkva.us/FAQ.aspx?TID=20 [http://perma.cc/6Z8L-JF4S].
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (2014).
104. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (2016).
105. Id.
106. See infra Section IV.D.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (2016).
108. HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 11.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“Other domestic relationships include, for example, brother-sister, father-son.”).
111. Id.
112. See infra notes 113–16.
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intimidate their victims.113 The abuser may try to preempt and
diminish the true victim’s accusation by calling the police first to re-
port the victim injuring the abuser.114 Further, victims may be afraid
to report abuse because they believe that they may be arrested.115 Also,
an arrested victim may have to unfairly deal with immigration or
child custody consequences as a result of the arrest.116
Some fear that dual arrests are unfairly harsh on females.117
They insist that mandatory arrest policies encourage police to arrest
females who are actually the victims in the incidents.118 Critics
respond that this argument is based on studies with small sample
sizes.119 Often the research only involves a small section of a state
or jurisdiction.120 Further, other studies noted that as long as the
circumstances were similar, men and women were equally likely to
be arrested in cases of intimate partner violence.121 However, certain
situations are more likely to trigger a dual arrest; police were three
times more likely to arrest both parties when the main perpetrator
was female and the main victim was male.122 This suggests that males,
not females, are at a disadvantage with the police in incidents of re-
ciprocal violence.123 Police officers were also more likely to make a
dual arrest when the incident involved homosexual couples versus
heterosexual couples.124 This implies that police stereotype when
making arrests in these situations, which could be partially addressed
through increased police training.125
The movement to prevent domestic abuse has a strange discon-
nect.126 Victim advocates often want to have domestic violence
treated as a crime, but they are wary of arrests as a solution.127 How-
ever, if police do not arrest anyone because they cannot determine
113. See Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Violence
Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149, 178 (2009).
114. Id. at 178 n.23.
115. Ken Armstrong & T. Christian Miller, When Sexual Assault Victims Are Charged
With Lying, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/opinion/sun
day/sexual-assault-victims-lying.html [https://perma.cc/KN5B-GW4T].
116. Rutledge, supra note 113, at 178 n.234.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 5.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 8, 11.
122. Id. at 8, 11, 13.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 13.
125. HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 13.
126. Barbara J. Hart, Arrest: What’s the Big Deal?, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 207,
207 (1997).
127. Id.
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the predominant aggressor, other problems may occur.128 For exam-
ple, policies against dual arrests may encourage police to do nothing.129
If the police fail to arrest either party because he or she cannot de-
termine the predominant aggressor, the party in the victim role in the
next incident may feel helpless and cynical with the system.130 In fact,
two-thirds of women who suffer from domestic abuse are hesitant to
call the police because they fear that the police either will not believe
them or that the police will do nothing.131 If both parties see that the
police will not do anything when both parties commit acts of vio-
lence, then there may be little incentive to ask for help if it became
necessary in the future.132 However, the opposite could also be true.
If a victim believes that no one will be arrested, he or she may be
more likely to call the police just to stop the violence.133 Yet, this
could create other problems where victims and abusers are using
police resources to arbitrate minor domestic disputes.134
IV. LOOKING FOR ALTERNATE SOLUTIONS TO RECIPROCAL
VIOLENCE IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SITUATIONS
State action to prevent domestic violence is still relatively
recent.135 Legislatures began to pass major reform measures for do-
mestic violence punishment and prevention in the 1970s.136 The ini-
tial reforms sought to make it easier for police to arrest abusers and
protect victims.137 Over the past fifty years, state legislatures and
researchers have continually sought to find a solution to domestic
abuse issues.138 Early legislation sought to increase criminal sanctions
128. See infra notes 129–32.
129. See Mary Beth D. Collins, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Addressing the Issues for
the Proper Protection of Victims, 4 J.L. SOC’Y 99, 104 (2002).
130. Id.
131. TK Logan & Rob Valente, Who Will Help Me? Domestic Violence Survivors Speak
Out About Law Enforcement Responses, NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE 2 (2015),
http://www.thehotline.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/09/NDVH-2015-Law-En
forcement-Survey-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU7A-FA9L].
132. See Collins, supra note 129, at 4.
133. See Logan & Valente, supra note 131, at 6, 9 (noting that one out of seven women
are “extremely likely” to call the police in the future. Also, “[a] large number of survivors
do call the police. Studies show that survivors are more likely to consider calling law en-
forcement for help after multiple prior victimizations.”).
134. See id. at 6 (“Depending on the study, researchers f ind that calls relating to do-
mestic violence constitute up to 50% of all calls to police.” ).
135. See HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 4.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. JEFFREY FAGAN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS 1 (1996), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/crimdom.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LW8F-23NM].
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against offenders and correct societal stereotypes.139 The results of
these efforts are mixed.140 The treatment of domestic violence cases
does not have one perfect solution.141 No single theory solves all the
aspects and nuances of this complex issue.142 While women are shown
to commit a considerable number of violent acts in relationships,
“women’s rates of violence are considerably lower and their acts are
less severe than those perpetrated by males.”143 Yet, that does not
mean that the government should take female acts of violence less
seriously when they do occur. A goal of the legal system should be to
hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.144
A. Encouraging Arrests and Convictions as a Solution
When both parties physically batter one another and when there
is no evidence of self-defense, the violent party violates the liberty of
the other and upsets the community’s ideas of justice.145 Generally, the
community does not accept violent acts that are not in self-defense.146
Those who commit unjustifiable violent acts should be arrested and
punished for the good of society.147 A party should not be able to shield
his or her actions merely because the other party used violence as well.
Research suggests that arrests act as a deterrent to domestic
violence to some degree.148 Even the National Domestic Violence
Hotline suggests that one of most beneficial actions a police officer
can take in a domestic violence situation is to arrest or charge the
abuser.149 In Virginia, the total arrest rate for domestic violence cases
139. Id. at 1–2.
140. Id. (“Thus far, however, research and evaluation on arrest and prosecution, civil
or criminal protection orders, batterer treatment, and community interventions have gen-
erated weak or inconsistent evidence of deterrent effects on either repeat victimization
or repeat offending. For every study that shows promising results, one or more show either
no effect or even negative results that increase the risks to victims.”).
141. See Cheryl Hanna, The Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic
Violence, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1512–13 (1998).
142. Id.
143. David Hirschel et al., Domestic Violence and Mandatory Arrest Laws: To What
Extent do they Influence Police Arrest Decisions, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 255, 260
(2007).
144. Hart, supra note 126, at 208.
145. Id. at 207–08.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. FAGAN, supra note 138.
149. Logan & Valente, supra note 131, at 11–12 (noting, however, that “[w]e must con-
tinue building strong, collaborative relationships between law enforcement agencies and
victim service programs that ensure that survivors’ safety and dignity are enhanced—not
harmed—by law enforcement responses.”).
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is 55.8 percent.150 The police could potentially arrest both parties in
5.1 percent of the domestic violence cases.151 The actual dual arrest
rate in Virginia’s domestic violence cases is two percent.152 This sug-
gests two things. First, the fact that police arrest both parties in less
than half of the cases where they could potentially arrest both sug-
gests that police still use individual discretion, even though Virginia
is a mandatory arrest state.153 Second, if those statistics hold true,
roughly 423 defendants, or two percent, of the 21,158 people charged
under Virginia’s misdemeanor offense of assault and battery against
a family or household member, were arrested in a dual arrest cir-
cumstance in 2013.154 While dual arrests are not a popular solution
for mutual violence, critics should feel some relief that they are only
occurring in a small fraction of cases.155
While arrest may act as a deterrent, lack of prosecution may un-
dermine its effectiveness.156 Historically, the prosecution and con-
viction rates of those charged with domestic violence were low.157 In
modern times, the rate of prosecution for intimate partner violence
varies depending on the jurisdiction.158 In Virginia, courts found about
19.6 percent of defendants guilty of misdemeanor assault and bat-
tery against a household or family member in 2013.159 Assuming
that dual arrests resulted in 423 people charged, and assuming that
the dual arrests have the same conviction rate as the total arrests,
then Virginia courts likely found almost eighty-three dual-arrest de-
fendants guilty of the misdemeanor offense in 2013.160
In addition, Virginia courts’ findings of guilt for the misdemeanor
assault and battery of a household or family member cases has de-
clined since 2003.161 While I do not speculate the reason for the
150. DAVID HIRSCHEL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXPLAINING THE PREVALENCE,
CONTEXT, AND CONSEQUENCES OF DUAL ARREST IN INTIMATE PARTNER CASES 114 (2007),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdff iles1/nij/grants/218355.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE4V-LXAP].
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. See id. But see HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 20.
154. See HERRING, supra note 1, at c; HIRSCHEL ET AL., supra note 150, at 114.
155. See supra Section III.C.
156. FAGAN, supra note 138, at 15.
157. Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Prosecution and Conviction Rates for
Intimate Partner Violence, 34 GA. ST. U. CRIM. JUST. REV. 44, 45–46 (2009) (noting, how-
ever, that terms like “low” do not have any set meaning. People do not know what would
constitute a sufficient number of arrests.).
158. Id. at 53.
159. See HERRING, supra note 1, at c.
160. See id. But see HIRSCHEL, supra note 86, at 11 (noting domestic violence, spe-
cifically intimate partner violence, was more likely to result in a conviction).
161. See HERRING, supra note 1, at c (calculating that 31.3 percent of misdemeanor as-
sault and battery against a household or family member charges resulted in guilty f inds
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decline, it does imply that Virginia courts are becoming less willing
to prosecute people for more minor domestic violence. Whatever the
reason for the decline, it is important for the dignity of the wronged
party, even in mutual violence contexts, that judges are not indiffer-
ent to crimes that occur and that prosecutors are sensitive to par-
ties’ needs.162 The prosecutor’s job is to serve the state’s and society’s
interests by ensuring the punishment of wrongdoers.163 I argue that if
both parties in a domestic violence case are properly considered wrong-
doers, then it is in society’s interest to punish both.
B. Applying Non-Domestic Assault Solutions to Assault and
Battery Against a Family or Household Member Cases
Imagine that two people, A and B, are in a bar’s parking lot. A
and B start to verbally argue. A is enraged and pushes B away. B, also
angry, responds by punching A in the face. A tackles B and a wrestling
match ensues. By the time the police arrive, both A and B have
physical, but non-serious injuries. A and B did not cause any prop-
erty damage or harm any third parties. When A and B are strangers,
their actions are both deemed criminal even though they are only
harming each other.164 As other courts have argued, “[i]n cases of
mutual ‘fighting’ . . . there is no primary offender or victim; this
conduct is punished only because the turmoil of the fight could breach
or threaten the public peace.”165 If A and B are a married couple
instead of strangers, does this change anything? The answer may
depend on the state where the fight occurs.
Some jurisdictions consider mutual violence to be a lesser of-
fense than assault and battery in non-domestic abuse cases. In New
Hampshire, simple assault occurs when one person causes non-serious
bodily harm or unwanted physical contact against another.166 Nor-
mally, New Hampshire considers simple assault a misdemeanor
offense.167 When the evidence shows that the fight was mutually
in 2003; 30.6 percent in 2004; 29.7 percent in 2005; 30.9 percent in 2006; 29.1 percent in
2007; 26.9 percent in 2008; 23.4 percent in 2009; 25.9 percent in 2010; 21.4 percent in
2011; and 22.9 percent in 2012).
162. See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape Victims and Prosecutors: The Inevitable Ethical Con-
flict of De Facto Client/Attorney Relationships, 48 S. TEX. L. REV. 695, 698 (2007).
163. Id. at 697.
164. See Dawson v. State, 264 P.3d 851, 859 (Alaska Ct. App. 2011).
165. Id.
166. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 631:2-a(I) (1979) (“A person is guilty of simple assault if
he: (a) Purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury or unprivileged physical contact to
another; or (b) Recklessly causes bodily injury to another; or (c) Negligently causes bodily
injury to another by means of a deadly weapon.”).
167. Id.
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entered into, the offense becomes a violation rather than a more se-
verely punishable misdemeanor.168 New Hampshire punishes misde-
meanors with up to a year in prison and a fine up to two thousand
dollars.169 A violation for fighting with mutual consent is punishable
by only a maximum one-thousand-dollar fine.170
In non-domestic cases, Vermont also punishes assault cases that
consist of mutual fighting less severely than other non-domestic
assault incidents.171 Simple assault can be punished up to a year in
prison and a fine up to one thousand dollars.172 If combatants enter
into a mutual fight, the maximum punishment is a five-hundred-
dollar fine and sixty days in jail.173
Nebraska also has a less severe punishment if a non-domestic
fight is mutually entered into.174 In Nebraska, a normal assault and
battery is punishable by a maximum of “not more than one year im-
prisonment, or one thousand dollars fine, or both.”175 Mutually entered
into fights, on the other hand, are punishable by a maximum of “six
months imprisonment, or one thousand dollars fine, or both.”176
Similarly, under Alaska law, the State considers a mutually
entered into or agreed upon non-domestic fight a lesser crime of dis-
orderly conduct, rather than assault and battery.177 As a Class B mis-
demeanor, disorderly conduct can be punished for up to ten days in jail
or a two-thousand-dollar fine or both.178 Alaska state law punishes
168. Id.
169. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:2(II)(c) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 651:2(IV)(A) (2016).
170. § 651:2(IV)(A).
171. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1023 (2015).
172. Id.
173. Id.; see § 1026 (noting that disorderly conduct may also involve engaging in a
fight, but must be done in a public setting. The punishment for disorderly conduct is the
same as punishment for simple assault with mutual consent.).
174. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-310(2) (1977) (“Assault in the third degree shall be a Class I
misdemeanor unless committed in a f ight or scuffle entered into by mutual consent, in
which case it shall be a Class II misdemeanor.”).
175. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-106 (2016).
176. Id.
177. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a) (2016) (“A person commits the crime of disorderly
conduct if, . . . in a public or private place, the person challenges another to f ight or en-
gages in fighting other than in self-defense.”); Dawson v. State, 264 P.3d 851, 858 (Alaska
Ct. App. 2011) (“The fact that a person who is found guilty of disorderly conduct for ‘en-
gaging in f ighting other than in self-defense’ faces such a minimal penalty compared to
the sentences that can be imposed for assault or even harassment suggests to us that the
legislature viewed disorderly conduct as a significantly lesser offense.”).
178. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(c) (2016) (stating that disorderly conduct is a class B mis-
demeanor); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(b)(6) (2016) (stating that the f ine for a class B
misdemeanor is two thousand dollars); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135 (2016) (“A defendant con-
victed of a class B misdemeanor may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not
more than (1) 10 days unless otherwise specified in the provision of law defining the offense
or in this section; (2) 90 days if the conviction is for a violation of (A) AS 11.61.116(c)(1) and
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mutually entered into non-domestic fights the same whether par-
ticipants fought in public or private.179 Compared with Alaska’s
assault in the fourth degree, which is a Class A misdemeanor, disor-
derly conduct is not too harshly punished.180 Even as the least seri-
ous of Alaska’s assault charges, assault of the fourth degree is still
punished to up to a year in prison181 or a twenty-five-thousand-dollar
fine or both.182
In contrast, Virginia’s non-domestic assault and battery law does
not expressly mitigate the sentence or severity of the offense if it
involves mutually entered into fighting.183 This suggests that the
Virginia legislature did not intend those who engaged in mutual fight-
ing to receive a lesser punishment than others who commit an assault
and battery.184 Officially, Virginia punishes assault and battery of
nonfamily or household members the same as assault and battery
of family or household members.185 Therefore, if the legislature did
not wish to lessen the punishment due to mutually entered into
fights in non-domestic assault and battery, then the courts should
not allow it to mitigate under assault and battery of a family or
household member either. If the legislature worries that the current
punishment in cases of mutual violence is too harsh, they could
change the law to encourage mitigated punishment in cases of mu-
tual domestic violence.
C. Mutual Violence in Virginia Homicide Cases
In Virginia, courts generally discuss mutual combat in homi-
cide cases.186 Some of the rationales in those cases may be applied
in domestic violence contexts too. In the homicide case, Carr v. Com-
monwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court determined that evidence
the person is 21 years of age or older; or (B) AS 11.61.120(a)(6) and the person is 21 years
of age or older.” ).
179. ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.110(a)(5).
180. ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.230 (2016) (“A person commits the crime of assault in the
fourth degree if (1) that person recklessly causes physical injury to another person; (2) with
criminal negligence that person causes physical injury to another person by means of a
dangerous instrument; or (3) by words or other conduct that person recklessly places
another person in fear of imminent physical injury.”).
181. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.135(a).
182. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.035(b)(5).
183. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2016).
184. See id.
185. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57 (2016) with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.2 (2016).
186. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 583 S.E.2d 773, 780 (Va. Ct. App. 2003); Smith
v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E.2d 414 (Va. Ct. App. 1993); Carr v. Commonwealth, 114 S.E.
791 (Va. 1922); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E. 487, 488 (Va. 1900).
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of mutual combat precludes the possibility of using a self-defense
claim.187 The case did not state what grade of homicide the offense
was if mutual combat occurred.188 Other cases suggest, however, that
circumstances of mutual combat could mitigate a homicide to man-
slaughter, versus a murder conviction, depending on the circum-
stances.189 I conclude from this that the presence of mutual violence,
rather than being a defense to the crime, should be at most a miti-
gating factor.
In Smith v. Commonwealth, the trial court and the appellate
court disagreed whether circumstances of the homicide involved mu-
tual combat.190 In this case, the accused, Jermaine Jerome Smith,
shot and killed Donnell Skinner.191 Skinner and one of his friends,
James Thompson, accused Smith of stealing some of their cocaine.192
Skinner and Thompson confronted Smith at Smith’s girlfriend
Crystal White’s apartment.193 Essentially, Skinner and Thompson
held Smith and White hostage and made threats against their
lives.194 Despite Smith’s efforts to pay off Skinner and forego vio-
lence, Skinner told Thompson, “just go ahead and do what we said we
were going to do.”195 Thompson then cocked his gun and Skinner,
gun in hand, began to turn towards Smith.196 Smith, pulling out his
own gun, then shot Skinner and continued to fire randomly until he
used all his ammunition.197 Thompson returned fire after Smith’s
initial shot and shot Smith in the arm after Smith finished firing.198
The trial court determined that mutual combat occurred be-
cause Smith instigated the encounter by taking the drugs in the first
place and denied Smith’s self-defense claim.199 However, the Virginia
187. Carry, 114 S.E. at 794–95 (upholding the jury instruction stating that “[t]he court
instructs the jury that if they shall believe from the evidence in this cause [sic] beyond
a reasonable doubt that both the accused and the deceased made threats one against the
other, and that because of said threats each armed himself against the other, and that
when they met on the public highway each began to shoot at such other just as soon as he
was able, resulting in the deceased being killed by the accused, that then the accused
cannot rely upon the law of self-defense as a complete defense, and must be found guilty
of some degree of homicide.”).
188. Id. at 795.
189. Rhodes, 583 S.E.2d at 779.
190. Smith, 435 S.E.2d at 416–17.
191. Id. at 415.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 416.
195. Id.
196. Smith, 435 S.E.2d at 416.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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Court of Appeals determined that “[n]o credible evidence supports
the trial judge’s finding that Smith shot Skinner while they were
engaged in mutual combat.” 200 The appeals court determined that
Smith did not voluntarily enter into the shootout, which precludes a
finding of mutual combat.201 This case demonstrates that, in homicide
cases, instead of being a defense to a manslaughter charge, evidence
of mutual combat only precludes a self-defense claim.202 It also demon-
strates that prior provocation, such as previously stealing someone
else’s drugs, is not enough to call a situation mutual combat.203
In an old Virginia case, Jackson v. Commonwealth, the court de-
termined that Jackson and the deceased engaged in mutual combat.204
The men first began fighting with their hands, but both then reached
for rocks.205 Jackson threw his rock at the deceased, killing him, as
the deceased was attempting to back away.206 Jackson did not attempt
to leave or stop the fight after it began.207 The court determined that
Jackson did not act in self-defense because at no point did Jackson at-
tempt to retreat.208 Furthermore, the court determined that Jackson
had a duty to retreat.209
Cases of mutual combat are those in which this duty of retreat-
ing to the wall oftenest appears. Two men being in the wrong,
neither can right himself except by retreating to the wall. So that,
when one unexpectedly f inds himself so hotly pursued by the
other that he can save himself only by taking the other’s life, if
he does it he is guilty of felonious homicide, unless he first with-
draws from the place.210
This case suggests that once a mutually entered fray occurs, both par-
ties have a duty to retreat.211 The parties only stop being liable for
harm they inflict on the other once they attempt to retreat or exit the
fight.212 Applying this logic to domestic violence cases, when parties
are both actively engaged in fighting, they both should be liable for
punishment until they attempt to exit the fray.213
200. Id. at 417.
201. Id.
202. Smith, 435 S.E.2d at 417.
203. Id.
204. Jackson v. Commonwealth, 36 S.E. 487, 488 (Va. 1900).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 489.
209. Id.
210. Jackson, 36 S.E. at 489 (citation omitted).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id.
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D. Encouraging Treatment for Both Parties in Domestic
Violence Cases
As noted above, Virginia allows some defendants, who are charged
with assault and battery of a family member, to defer the proceed-
ing in favor of completing a treatment program or probation.214 If
the person charged successfully completes the program and the terms
of probation, the court may drop the charges.215 I argue that courts
should utilize these programs for both parties, in cases of mutual
violence, when one party was not acting in self-defense.
One controversial solution to help combat cases involving mutual
violence is to encourage couples counseling.216 Proponents of couples
therapy believe that the root of the couple’s problem is poor conflict
and anger management, which causes domestic disputes.217 Accord-
ing to proponents, couples therapy could be useful in domestic as-
sault situations, especially in cases of mutual violence, because it
requires both parties to look at their actions and address any mu-
tual culpability.218 It could be healthy for both parties to work through
their anger and communication problems, especially if the couple
plans to stay together.219 
However, there are concerns with using couples therapy in sit-
uations of domestic abuse. A good number of states expressly ban
couples counseling in violent domestic abuse cases.220 Many organiza-
tions also condemn the use of couples therapy in violent situations.221
Some opponents of couples counseling in abuse situations reject it
because they view the party using violence as entirely at fault for
their actions.222 The critics argue that couples counseling risks normal-
izing and legitimizing criminal behavior and puts the victim in more
214. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-57.3 (2017).
215. Id.
216. STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, HOW EFFECTIVE ARE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PRO-
GRAMS IN STOPPING PARTNER ABUSE? (2010), http://www.saveservices.org/downloads/Why
-DV-Programs-Fail-to-Stop-Abuse [https://perma.cc/6EZX-UDQF] [hereinafter STOP ABU-
SIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS].
217. Hanna, supra note 141, at 1527.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. STOP ABUSIVE & VIOLENT ENV’TS, supra note 216, at 4.
221. See, e.g., Phyllis B. Frank & Beverly D. Houghton, A Policy Statement on Do-
mestic Violence Couples Counseling, FAITH TRUST INST., http://www.faithtrustinstitute
.org/resources/articles/Policy-Statement-on-DV-Couples-Counseling.pdf [https://perma.cc
/T98N-TNUN]; Why We Don’t Recommend Couples Counseling for Abusive Relationships,
NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.thehotline.org/2014/08/01
/why-we-don’t-recommend-couples-counseling-for-abusive-relationships [https://perma
.cc/9BF2-EXXH].
222. Hanna, supra note 141, at 1528.
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danger of abuse.223 Still, even anti-couples counseling groups sug-
gest that both parties could benefit from separate counseling.224 Any
party who commits acts of violence, which is not self-defense, could
use help to address the source of his or her violent actions.225 This
remains true even in situations where both parties commit acts of
violence against the other.
Treatment programs are not a perfect solution.226 For one, there
is not a clear consensus about the cause of domestic violence, or best
treatment for domestic violence in general.227 Some domestic violence
is rooted in substance abuse, some in psychological issues, some in
anger and aggressive control problems, and some in a power dynamic
struggle.228 Many jurisdictions use a one-size-fits-all approach that
may prove ineffective for some offenders.229 These programs are often
gender-biased towards men and do not take into account substances
abuse or psychological problems.230 The effectiveness of treatment
programs in general is debatable, especially because it is difficult to
measure realistic results due to a lack of a control group.231
In Virginia, whether a person can get treatment as a part of
probation depends on whether the community has the resources.232
Virginia, as of October 2016, has eighteen certified batterer inter-
vention programs.233 Most of these programs service multiple cities.234
223. Frank & Houghton, supra note 221.
224. Id. (“The batterer and the battered woman have two different problems. His prob-
lem is his violent behavior. Hers is that she is coupled with a batterer. These two distinct
issues are safely and effectively dealt with in separate counseling.”).
225. See id.
226. Megan Twohey, How can Domestic Abuse be Stopped?, CHI. TRIBUNE (Jan. 2, 2009),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/chi-abusers-02-jan02-story.html [https://perma.cc
/NK6D-AQDF].
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based probation services agency established pursuant to Article 9 (§ 9.1-173 et seq.) of
Chapter 1 of Title 9.1 is available, order that the eligible person be placed with such
agency and require, as a condition of local community-based probation, the person to suc-
cessfully complete all treatment, education programs or services, or any combination
thereof indicated by an assessment or evaluation obtained by the local community-based
probation services agency if such assessment, treatment or education services are
available; or (ii) require successful completion of treatment, education programs or ser-
vices, or any combination thereof, such as, in the opinion of the court, may be best suited
to the needs of the person.”).
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Virginia’s Attorney General lists the qualifications for certifying
batterer intervention programs.235 Virginia’s batterer intervention
program’s goals include (1) “[s]top[ping] the violence and prevent-
[ing] the reoccurrence of future violence, while ensuring victim safety,”
(2) “[i]dentify[ing] abusive behaviors,” (3) “[t]each[ing] alternatives to
violence,” (4) “[e]xplor[ing] the impact of violent and abusive behav-
ior on intimate partners, children, and others,” and (5) “[a]ssist[ing]
individuals in examining the beliefs they hold about violence.” 236
Certified programs require those enrolled to complete at least thirty-
six hours of group therapy over eighteen weeks.237 If an individual
is referred to a program, the program also assesses the individual for
drug and alcohol dependencies and severe mental issues.238 Programs
may also provide services to victims of abuse or provide information
about other services available.239 While the programs do charge fees,
they also provide services to indigent clients.240 Moreover, while the
number of programs specifically designed for batterers may be lim-
ited, Virginia still has the resources available for many people.241
As an example of treatment in Virginia, Staunton, Virginia has
three treatment groups for domestic violence offenders.242 The treat-
ment groups focus on “anger management, batterer prevention or
domestic violence issues.” 243 Judges refer the offender to community
corrections programs for assessment and evaluation to determine
the appropriate treatment.244 The offender’s score on the assess-
ment, combined with the offender’s prior records, determine the ap-
propriate level of treatment.245
It should also be noted that under the current Virginia law, a
judge is only allowed to defer findings of guilt when it is the first
time the offender is charged with assault and battery of a family
member.246 If a person was previously convicted of assault and bat-
tery of a family member or even if they had their case dismissed
after successfully completing their deferral probation, the person is
235. Domestic Violence—Batterer Intervention Programs, VA. BATTERER INTERVENTION
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now ineligible for deferral in future cases.247 Still, for those who are
worried about those who are generally victims being prosecuted under
a pro–dual arrest policy, the deferral for first time offenders may be
a good way to ensure that both parties get the treatment they need
without actually entering a conviction.248
CONCLUSION
Mutual combat in domestic violence situations remains very
much a gray zone. At this time, there is no perfect solution. Virginia
courts do not have a one-size-fits-all remedy for handling reciprocal
violence cases of assault and battery of a household or family mem-
ber. In the case of domestic mutual violence, society has conflicting
interests.249 While there may be a visceral reaction against arresting
and convicting someone who may be a victim of ongoing domestic
violence, society has an interest in punishing those who commit vio-
lent acts outside of self-defense.250 The real issue is how to go about
doing so.
While arrest and prosecution of both people involved in a mu-
tual domestic violence situation is far from the ideal solution, there
currently is no better solution available.251 Automatically dismissing
the case is not in society’s best interest. To limit the harm to poten-
tial real victims in mutual combat situations, the state and court
could mitigate the punishment.252 The mitigation could help ensure
that harm is recognized and possibly deterred and prevent future
incidents. Further, a mitigated conviction could be used to encour-
age both parties to seek counseling programs to help their situa-
tions. In mutual domestic violence situations, the government has
the choice to either dismiss the case and hope the situation goes
away, or to offer some sort of punishment or rehabilitation to the
parties in order to hopefully prevent the harm in the future. The lat-
ter has the greater likelihood of helping until we can find a better
solution in the future.
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